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Preface 
You are reading the first sentence of the qualitative study on the relation between 
resistance and support of social and political actors and the opinion of students regarding 
European integration. The thesis was written to fulfil the graduation requirements of the 
Master’s program International Relations at the Universiteit Leiden. Within the program I 
specialized in European Union Studies. The thesis was written between January and May 
2018. Due to my interest in the ‘crisis’ of the European Union, the continuous decrease of 
support for further European integration, I did chose to write a thesis on this topic.  
 
The thesis is written for a general audience but mainly persons with an interest in European 
Union Studies will be determined to go through my research. For academics interested in 
the relation between youth and Euroscepticism the project supplements the already existing 
body of literature consisting of mainly quantitative studies. For European policymakers the 
project is useful to find out if increased scepticism about European integration leads to 
more opposition among youngsters.  
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Brian Shaev for his guidance during the project, his 
constructive feedback on both structure and language use was essential for handing in this 
final version. Of course I am grateful as well towards the fourteen respondents who 
participated in the interviews and the family members and friends who distributed the 
introductory note about the project. Lastly I would like to thank those closest to me, my 
parents, brother and girlfriend for their support and motivation.  
 
I sincerely hope you enjoy reading. 
 
Lars Ankum 
 
Amsterdam, 18 May 2018  
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Abstract 
The Treaty of Maastricht halted the relatively straightforward process towards an ever 
closer European Union. Opinions about integration became more dispersed and resistance 
to European integration can now be found in all layers of society. This increased resistance, 
or its opposite support, can influence the opinion of citizens about European integration. 
One group of citizens is especially vulnerable, youngsters between 18 and 25, who are still in 
a period of extraordinary psychological and social change. Goal of this research project is to 
analyse if resistance or support of these groups of actors influences the opinion of 
youngsters, in this regard students, about European integration.  
 
To analyse the relation semi-structured interviews are employed with students from EU 
member states studying in the Netherlands. Along resistance and support of actors three 
additional factors were considered, political and economic considerations, identity and the 
role of the media. Of these factors a conceptualization of several elements of the identity of 
a respondent, their personal background, was found to be most important. Resistance and 
support and economic considerations were of secondary importance. 
 
The results point to a smaller influence of external factors than expected. As long as 
students are satisfied with their socio-economic position they are not influenced heavily by 
external factors. Instead they formulate their opinion about European integration based on 
their personal background. Based on the results of my research project European 
policymakers should focus on economic and social benefits if they want to ensure the 
support of the young generation. Further research should explore this conclusion in more 
depth by conducting interviews with a more diverse, lower educated, group of students.  
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Introduction 
Euroscepticism is, as Usherwood & Startin (2013) note, currently a persistent phenomenon 
all over Europe as the European integration process finds itself on a bumpy road in the 
twenty-first century. Examples as the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, the difficulties 
around implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the backdrop of the Eurocrisis illustrate 
that deepening of European integration is not self-evident anymore . Most academics belief 
that it is the Treaty of Maastricht that triggered the end of a permissive consensus, the 
relatively straightforward integration process until the 90s. What followed is a period of 
constraining dissensus, negotiations about European issues became more contested in 
several ways (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). This thesis however argues, following Down & Wilson 
(2008), that a shift from consensus to dissensus is somewhat misleading. A more nuanced 
picture shows that it is not the level of support that is different now but rather the level of 
disagreement. Down & Wilson show that the distribution of opinions changed, with 
attitudes being more dispersed and the distribution flatter. Crespy & Verschueren (2009) 
summarize that the Treaty of Maastricht had a qualitative rather than a quantitative impact 
on support for Europe, it brought about a dispersion and differentiation of opinions over 
European integration rather than an increase in opposition.  
 
In addition, Crespy & Verschueren (2009) assume that, although the visibility of contention 
over integration has unarguably increased since the early 1990s, European integration has 
always been intrinsically contentious. Understanding the debate over European integration 
on the longer term responds to the call of Vasilopoulou (2013) for a more holistic approach 
to Euroscepticism. Vasilopoulou argues that Euroscepticism should be treated as an 
independent as well as a dependent variable because of its persistence, embeddedness and 
changing nature over time. She points out that the concept has until now predominantly 
been treated as a dependent variable with authors trying to understand its nature or explain 
its drivers. Treating Euroscepticism as an independent variable however helps us 
understand how opposition to European integration has impacted the European integration 
process over time. When accepting this influence of Euroscepticism on the longer term, the 
concept can be used to analyse the influence of the dispersion in opinions after Maastricht.  
 
The claim that European integration has always been intrinsically contentious presupposes 
an influence of this debate on European integration. A process such as European integration 
is however very broad and can be analysed from a variety of angles. In this report I join 
Crespy & Verschueren (2009) in arguing that general public opinions from sources such as 
the Eurobarometer are not the best empirics to study contention over integration and turn 
instead to the realm of qualitative research. I suggest that qualitative research aligns best 
with the conceptualization of Vasilopoulou (2013) and helps me understand how 
Euroscepticism changed over time. Several terms can be used to analyse the 
contentiousness of European integration. Actors can oppose, content or be sceptic and 
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support, applaud or encourage European integration. In this thesis I adopt the notion of 
resistances, and as opposite support, for EU integration. Resistances can be defined as 
¨manifestations of hostility towards one (or several) aspect(s) of European integration 
perceived as a threat to one's values (Crespy & Verschueren, 2009)¨. This conceptualization 
aligns with Vasilopoulouʼs remark about the changing nature of the concept as it is a tool for 
studying long term processes (Crespy & Verschueren, 2009). The thesis adopts resistance 
and support of a variety of actors and considers the influence of these actors as an 
independent variable. Interviews with students will be used to analyse the influence in 
which the opinion of students about European integration serves as the dependent variable. 
 
An analysis of the opinion of students is especially relevant in this period of constraining 
dissensus. The dispersion after Maastricht led to an even more contested debate about 
European integration but the consequences of the divergence in opinions for the general 
public have received little attention. The choice for the opinion of students evolves from 
recent contradictory findings regarding the opinion of youngsters. Kersan-Škabić & Tomić 
(2009) show that young people are even more sceptical than older people. While elsewhere, 
for example in the recent Brexit referendum, results point to a higher level of positivism 
among youngsters (BBC, 2016). According to the most recent Eurobarometer young people 
are still largely in favour of European integration (European Commission, 2018). According 
to the results half of the youngsters (15-24) have a positive image of the EU while only 36 
percent of the oldest generation (55+) have a positive image. This generational divide 
features prominently in recent academic work on Euroscepticism. While other researchers, 
such as Guerra (2018) and Grimm, Pollock and Ellison (2018), explain the positive image of 
youngsters. What remains to be seen however is the influence of external factors on the 
opinion of youth. Fox & Pearce (2018) made a start on this topic utilizing quantitative 
analysis to identify generational differences in Euroscepticism. Goal of this research project 
is to add to the work of Fox & Pearce (2018) on the relation between external factors and 
the opinion of youth about European integration. Because of its qualitative approach the 
study allows for in-depth analysis and helps us understand both the nature of 
Euroscepticism over time and the influence of the divergence in opinions after Maastricht. 
The expectation is that especially students, which are still vulnerable to external influence 
when shaping their own opinion, are influenced by resistance and support of other actors.  
 
The remaining sections of this thesis are structured as follows. In the first chapter the 
theoretical framework is explicated and in the second chapter the research design and 
research methods relevant for this study are discussed. The third chapter considers the 
influence of the independent variables on the opinion of students. The thesis ends with a 
concluding section which also has discussing and reflecting elements. 
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Chapter 1: Opposition to the EU and the integration process 
The theoretical framework is shaped around the relation between resistance or support of 
actors regarding European integration and the process of European integration. Three 
additional factors are considered, political and economic considerations, identity and the 
role of the media. The first section of this chapter further explains the process of European 
integration. The second section examines resistance and support and highlights the 
difference between political and social actors. The third section looks at the political and 
economic considerations, the fourth at identity and the last at the role of the media.  
 
1.1 The process of European integration 
The process of European integration is a concept which is mentioned in the article of 
Vasilopoulou (2013). The concept basically entails two elements, the first being European 
integration the second a process. These elements are firstly examined separately after 
which the concept is explained in its entirety.  
 
To start off it should be mentioned that the concept European integration itself is 
ambiguous: it has static and dynamic meanings (Rose & Borz, 2016). The static meaning 
refers to the European Union as it is today. The dynamic definition, which is mentioned in 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, relates to European integration 
as a process of movement towards an ever closer Union. In their paper Rose & Borz (2016) 
argue that there is a difference between these two meanings as they find that a majority of 
the participants in an Eurobarometer change their position when asked to evaluate further 
integration vis-à-vis a question about the current situation. Both the static and dynamic 
meanings of European integration will be analysed as respondents will be asked about the 
development of European integration and the current situation. The focus will however be 
on the dynamic understanding as I see integration especially as a process of movement. 
 
The main characteristic of a process is that it is open-ended in contrast to results or 
outcomes which are already settled. An example is provided in the book of Schimmelfennig, 
Engert and Knobel (2006) who make a distinction between a ‘backward-looking’ and a 
‘forward-looking’ perspective when analysing the process of international socialization after 
the Cold War. This example is relevant since these authors apply the concept ‘process’ in a 
similar fashion, describing how the constitutive rules of the international community led to 
societal changes in European states. To do so the authors adopted a forward-looking 
perspective which has the advantage that it allows analysing the processes directed at or 
potentially leading to, in their regard, rule adoption by the target states. Like 
Schimmelfennig et al. I analyse the processes directed at or potentially leading to, in my 
regard, European integration. A variety of angles exists to do so. In this thesis the notions 
resistance and support were adopted which are well-fitted to analyse long-term processes. 
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To firstly illustrate the processes of the past leading to the current situation I turn to the 
article of Vasilopoulou (2013) who identified three periods in which resistance and support 
had a particular influence on the process of European integration.  
 
Elite-driven Euroscepticism 
In her article Vasilopoulou (2013) describes that Euroscepticism was elite-driven and 
arguably somewhat nation-specific in the beginning. While the ‘permissive consensus’ thesis 
describes the popular opinion at the time the political drive towards European integration 
was not straightforward as different visions about integration competed. During the early 
years of European integration, which started with the Schuman Plan and culminated in the 
European Coal and Steel Treaty of 1952, two main schools of thought can be recognized. In 
a 2002-article Carls & Naughton define these groups as functionalists and federalists. The 
models of these groups are described by them: ¨(1) building cooperation among countries 
through the integration of one or more highly important economic function shared by all of 
them (functionalism);  (2) directly establishing a European political federation (federalism)¨. 
Craig Parsons (2003) extends the categorization of Carls & Naughton as he introduces three 
key ideas about French interests in European institution building. The community model 
connected a wide range of national problems to solutions in supranational institutions. The 
traditional model stood for the status quo and opposed deeper forms of integration and the 
confederal model occupied the middle ground and favoured broad intergovernmentalist 
solutions. More so than Carls & Naughton, Parsons identified resistance to European 
integration, found with those who supported the traditional model. Nonetheless all authors 
argue that resistance in this period was limited to the fringes of elite groups as most were 
supportive of European integration.  
 
Popular Euroscepticism 
The first period lasted until the coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht. Vasilopoulou 
(2013) argues that the 2000s witnessed an increasing influence of critical discourse in the 
European public sphere indicating that, far from being an ephemeral phenomenon, 
Euroscepticism has become integral to the process of European integration. During the early 
years scepticism was predominantly found at the fringes of elite-groups but after 
Maastricht, when ordinary citizens finally realized that the EU also was a political project, 
criticism became apparent in all layers of the society. In their article Hooghe & Marks (2008) 
explain the development from elite-driven to popular scepticism. The indifference of the 
general public was dismantled as decision-making on European integration entered the 
contentious world of party competition, elections and referendums. Public opinion on 
European integration became rather well structured and started affecting national voting. 
While I showed earlier that the shift from consensus to dissensus is somewhat misleading 
(Down & Wilson, 2008) the processes during this period were significantly different than 
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during the first decades of European integration. The divergence in opinions, both resisting 
and supporting integration, led to more salience of the European issue. 
 
General Euroscepticism 
The integral status of Euroscepticism has been further exemplified by the outbreak of the 
economic crisis. Simone Guerra (2018) described how the economic crisis impacted on the 
already contested debates, channelled by Eurosceptic parties across party systems. National 
elites and politicians, sparked by popular discontent, started turning their backs on the 
European project and also began arguing against further integration. More so than during 
the previous phases this period combines mass and elite Euroscepticism. Baimbridge (2018) 
analysed the relation between the economic crisis and Euroscepticism and concluded that 
the crisis can possibly amplify scepticism even more. In a statistical analysis he recorded a 
relation between macroeconomic indicators such as national growth and inflation and 
Euroscepticism. The full effect of the economic crisis will still have to be determined but 
Baimbridge hypothesizes that the crisis can have a direct and an indirect effect. The direct 
effect is increased popular and elite discontent and the indirect effect the consequences of 
the austerity-based policies that were adopted to resolve the crisis which put pressure upon 
the European Social Model. Resistance became more widespread during this period and can 
now be found both under elites and ordinary citizens. An opposite process of increased 
support under Euroenthousiasts can however also be noted. The trajectory of European 
integration was significantly different during the three periods. In the next section I consider 
which actors resist and support and how this relates with the opinion of students.  
 
1.2 Resistance and support of political and social actors 
The body of literature about Euroscepticism has, especially as a consequence of the 
differentiation in opinions after the Treaty of Maastricht, significantly expanded during 
recent years. Euroscepticism as a concept is made up of two words, Euro, which essentially 
refers to criticism against (parts of) the European project, and scepticism. Hooghe & Marks 
(2007) provided a definition for scepticism: ¨the meaning of the word scepticism has 
diffused from its reference to the classical scepticism to mean ‘an attitude of doubt or a 
disposition of disbelief’ ¨. In a first definition on Euroscepticism by Paul Taggert (1998) this 
attitude of doubt was essential as Taggert distinguished between contingent or qualified 
opposition and outright or unqualified opposition. Not all actors who are Eurosceptic do 
indeed reject the entire European project, some oppose only certain elements.  
 
Later, Taggert refined his conceptualization, when he introduced, together with Aleks 
Szczerbiak (2002), the distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism. ‘Hard’ 
Euroscepticism referred to principled opposition to the EU - being opposed to the whole 
European project and a wish for withdrawal. ‘Soft’ Euroscepticism rather refers to qualified 
opposition to the EU and includes opposition to specific policies or issues which intrude on 
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national interests. In the same year Kopecký & Mudde (2002) criticize the aforementioned 
authors and provide an alternative conceptualization. Here, the authors draw on an older 
piece on political regimes, and categorize Euroscepticism not in a dichotomy from hard to 
soft but rather distinguish between ‘diffuse’ and ‘specific’ support for European integration. 
The diffuse support category points to the general ideas of the EU or the principle that the 
EU exists and the specific support category refers to the development of the EU and its 
current situation (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002). In her PhD-thesis Catharina Sørensen (2007) 
however points to the similarities in the two explanations, both classifying party positions. 
The main difference between the two approaches lies in the manner of categorizing. 
Taggert & Szczerbiak (2002) use a binary construction of opposition / support while Kopecký 
& Mudde (2002) consider the element a party is opposing / supporting.  
 
Most of the later pieces on Euroscepticism use categorizations which are based on the work 
of either Taggert & Szczerbiak or Kopecký & Mudde and it can be difficult to find a definition 
of Euroscepticism which combines both approaches. One of the few to do so is Sørensen 
(2007), who researched the concept Euroscepticism and came up with the following 
definition: 
 
¨Euroscepticism is a sentiment of disapproval—reaching a certain degree and durability—
directed towards the EU in its entirety or towards particular policy areas or developments 
(Sørensen, 2007)¨ 
 
Sørensen combines to the two perspectives and points to both the degree of disapproval 
and the policy area or development. Also she does not directly incorporate political parties 
but leaves room for interpretation who is having a sentiment of disapproval. Since I argued 
earlier that I would use the concept resistances I point to the similarities between the 
‘sentiment of disapproval’ of Sørensen and the ‘manifestations of hostility’ of Crespy & 
Verschueren (2009). One of the advantages of using resistances actually lies in its link with 
the diversity of potentially involved actors. Other classifications, such as a those recently 
provided by Szczerbiak & Taggert (2018), still predominantly focus on political parties. In this 
research project I do move behind this one-sided focus on political parties and capture 
social actors along political actors. Social actors became more important within the 
paradigm of multi-level governance which came into being after the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Both types of actors can influence the opinion of a student on European integration which is 
still vulnerable during his ‘formative years’ (Fox & Pearce, 2018). The concept resistances 
allows doing so as the diversity of potentially involved actors is incorporated.   
 
The concept ‘actor’ is a sociological concept and became widely used in academic work after 
World War II. Actors are not only individuals but refer to a wider range of entities having 
agency, including nation-states, non-governmental organizations and companies. Both 
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individuals and entities can shape the opinion of a respondent about European integration 
and they can do so both my opposing, which the definition of Sørensen (2007) captures, but 
also by supporting European integration. We should not forget that, even with the 
diversification of opinions after Maastricht, most citizens of the European Union, although 
often lukewarm, support European integration.  
 
Out of the general definition of an actor two categories can be determined. Political actors 
are considered to be ¨individuals who have obtained at least some measure of political  
power and/or authority in a particular society and engage in activities that can have a 
significant influence on decisions, policies, media coverage and outcomes associated with a 
given conflict (Wolfsfeld, 2015)¨. This definition for example captures leaders of political 
parties, high-level government officials and ministers but also, following the broader agency 
interpretation, political parties. Social actors on the other hand are seen by Stockinger 
(2005) as agents who possess a common cognitive reference frame and have a specific 
competence for dealing with this frame. An example is a group of people engaged in the 
same social practice, such as producing motor vehicles, who have organized their 
competence in a labour union. Other examples are religious communities, elite groups and 
farmer organizations. An individual can also be a social actor if the person has competence 
and references to a particular practice (e.g. the pope). Most media organizations are 
however not seen as social actors since they are not organized around a particular frame.  
 
Social and political actors can oppose or support European integration for multiple reasons 
about which a large body of literature exists. Problematic again is that most research still 
focuses on political parties rather than also considering social actors. Szczerbiak & Taggert 
(2018) for example examine that political parties oppose integration because of ideological-
programmatic or strategic-tactical reasons. The first is linked to the cleavages between party 
families such as the liberal, social- and Christian-democratic schools. The second aligns with 
strategic positioning and issues related with the electoral system, types of legislature and 
the spatial distribution of power. Opposition of social actors is thought to be influenced 
predominantly by the same types of factors as FitzGibbon (2013) concludes. However some 
non-party-based factors should be taken into account from which he identifies interest 
representation and a lack of political opportunities as the most important elements. 
 
1.3 Economic and political considerations 
In the period of dissensus after Maastricht opinions are more dispersed than earlier. 
Hooghe & Marks (2008) identify several factors influencing the wide-range of opinions. The 
first factor are cues from intermediary institutions or political parties, which are introduced 
in the previous section and the second is identity, introduced in the following section. A last 
factor influencing opinions are the objective consequences of market integration for 
individual economic well-being. Anderson & Reichert (1996) draw two simple conclusion 
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about the relation between economic benefits and support for European integration based 
on Eurobarometer results. They conclude (1) individuals living in countries that benefit more 
from EU membership display higher levels of support for their country's participation in the 
EU and (2) those individuals who benefit personally are also more supportive of the 
integration project. While criticized on some aspects the economic performance-model, also 
called the utilitarian model, still partly explains the opinion of students on European 
integration according to for instance Grimm et al. (2018). In their chapter Grimm et al. cite 
an earlier article of Hooghe & Marks (2005) and argue that the utilitarian model implies a 
distinction between economic losers and winners of European integration and suggests that 
individuals benefiting from the EUʼs economic policies will be more likely to support 
European integration.  
 
Especially during the early years of the European project public opinion was indeed seen as 
a cost/benefit analysis. Further political integration however changed this assumption. In 
her article McEvoy (2016) argues that citizen attitudes towards European integration are 
influenced by the output-oriented factors based on the EU’s capacity to yield economic 
beneﬁts but also by input-oriented factors related with feelings of political efficacy. Efficacy 
is defined as ¨an individual’s belief or expectation that their actions are meaningful (McEvoy, 
2016)¨ and can be divided in external and internal efficacy. External efficacy refers to a 
citizens perception that the political system responds to their needs while internal efficacy 
can be measured as political participation. To support European integration citizens do not 
only take economic benefits into account but also consider feelings of trust and perceptions 
of fairness of process that they afford to EU institutions (McEvoy, 2016). These perceptions, 
both economic and political, stand between influence on the opinion on the micro-level 
(identity) and the macro-level (resistance / support). While they can be shaped by others or 
by a changing identity the perceptions especially play a role on the longer term when an 
opinion regarding the European integration process is formulated. 
 
1.4 Social identity theory 
The concept identity is very broad and can be conceptualized in multiple ways. As most 
authors on the topic of Euroscepticism I turn to social identity theory to identify why 
identity is so crucial. Social identity theory was formulated by Henri Tajfel and John Turner 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Based on this perspective Nario-Redmond, Biernat, Eidelman & 
Palenske (2004) summarize that psychologists became increasingly aware that the ‘self’ 
represents more than just a collection of individualized attributes that remain constant over 
time and across contexts. Social identity theory was later expanded upon in self-
categorization theory. According to the self-categorization theory the self is conceptualized 
¨as a hierarchical structure with levels of increasing abstraction that each contribute to an 
individual’s sense of who he/she is (Nario-Redmond et al., 2004)¨. Sociologists of the 
constructivist school such as Tajfel and Turner thus argue that the identity or self of an 
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individual is formed at several levels. They identify two levels: the interpersonal level and 
the intergroup level. In their study Nario-Redmond et al. introduce both levels. The authors 
argue that at the interpersonal level ¨personal identity can be described in terms that 
differentiate the individual as distinct from other members of the in-group (e.g. I am a 
unique personality, creative, different)¨. Alongside, at the intergroup level ¨social identities 
are emphasizing the stereotypical similarities shared among members of the group (e.g. I am 
a Latina, a psychologist)¨. These two categories, personal and social identity, will be used to 
consider the influence of identity formation at both the interpersonal and intergroup level 
on the opinion of students about European integration.  
 
Regarding European integration it is especially social identity in the form of national identity 
which is thought to be influential. In earlier work Hooghe & Marks (2004) argue that 
humans have an emotional capacity for intense group loyalty which can be extremely 
powerful in shaping views toward political objects. National identity, rooted in strong 
linguistic and cultural ties, is the strongest of these group loyalties. Elsewhere Hooghe & 
Marks (2008) however argue that it is not this national identity by itself but how group 
identities relate to each other and whether and how they are mobilized in elite debate 
which is important for European integration. In an intense public debate after Maastricht it 
is group identities, national, but also at other geographical scale levels or at other 
community groups (religion, welfare state mode) which became more important. This 
conclusion does however not subvert the importance of the personal identity category as in 
the original study of Nario-Redmond et al. (2004) personal identity was more important for 
identity construction than social identity.  
 
Alongside I need to reflect on the difference between self-identification and identity 
according to demographics. According to Starks (2013) self-identification is seen as a 
sociological process of locating oneself within a social context. Basically you provide an 
answer to the question ‘Who am I?’ but often do so with reference to others by answering 
the question ‘Who are they?’. These questions relate with the levels within the hierarchical 
structure mentioned above. This clearly differs from identity according to demographics, 
when policy makers ascribe a certain identity to an individual. This thesis follows the self-
identification approach and asks respondents to locate oneself within a social context.  
 
1.5 The role of the media 
I argued earlier that media outlets are no social actors because they do in most instances 
not have a common reference frame. Nonetheless the influence of media organizations on 
the public opinion should not be underestimated. In her book chapter Michailidou (2018) 
discusses the role of the media in the Eurosceptic debate. She identifies three main 
empirical approaches about the relation between Euroscepticism and the media of which 
the approach that focuses on the effects of media frames on public opinion is the most 
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relevant for our purposes. In a study about the 2009-elections for the European Parliament 
van Spanje & de Vreese (2014) indeed concluded that media evaluations of the EU affect 
voting for Eurosceptic parties. The more a voter was exposed to framing of the EU in terms 
of benefits derived from membership in these countries, the less likely she or he was to cast 
a Eurosceptic vote. In one of the most influential studies on the topic de Vreese (2007) 
concludes that the influence of the media on Eurosceptic attitudes depends on two factors  
¨(a) the pervasiveness of the strategy news frame and (b) moderation by political 
sophistication¨. The first factor refers to the content of the news. If EU news is not covered 
in a suggestive frame it tends to lead to less cynicism about EU affairs. The second factor 
points to the level of knowledge about EU affairs. According to de Vreese (2007) persons 
who are less-sophisticated politically tend to be influenced more by critical news framing.  
 
Political sophistication can be linked to the term  ‘cognitive mobilization’ coined by Inglehart 
in 1970 which is a ¨broader process of the increasingly wide distribution of the political skills 
necessary to cope with an extensive political community¨. This means that if a person has 
more political knowledge he or she is less sensitive to information broadcasted in the news. 
A person who is less informed will also often use domestic proxies rooted in domestic 
political considerations (government, party and system support), as explained by Anderson 
(1998), to formulate an opinion about the integration process. The factors of de Vreese 
(2007) political sophistication, conceptualized here as cognitive mobilization, sometimes in 
the form of domestic proxies, and the pervasiveness of the news frame are the two 
dimensions of the last independent variable, the role of the media 
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Chapter 2: Research design and methods 
The second chapter considers the research design and methods employed in this thesis. The 
first section introduces the relevance of the research project and brings forward the 
research question and sub-questions. After that the hypotheses for the empirical work are 
presented and the conceptual framework is formulated. The fourth section constitutes of 
the operationalization of the main concepts and the fifth and sixth sections look at 
respectively the research strategy and methods.  
 
2.1 Problem definition and research question 
The Treaty on European Union was signed in 1992 and was greeted by the majority of the 
European population with indifference. The years after however did not pass quietly for the 
newly formed European Union. In 2000 10.000 people attended a demonstration of the 
union of European Federalists which campaigned for an European constitution. Contrary to 
that event the year before the United Kingdom Independence Party gained its first seats in 
the European Parliament. The two events can be seen as opposites, signalling the dispersion 
in opinions after Maastricht. Britain voting to leave the Union in 2016 with a margin of only 
3.8 percent is another example. Opposition or support for European integration is however 
not new but maybe only better visible for the wider public. Well-known politicians as 
Charles de Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher are often characterized by their opposition to 
integration.  
 
The dispersion of opinions is visible throughout the Union but one of the most interesting 
groups to analyse are young people, aged 18 to 25. In a 2016-survey of PewResearchCenter 
an age gap between young people (18 - 35) and older people (50+) was recorded in six of 
the ten EU member states participating in the survey. Young people were found to be 
significantly more positive about EU membership. Fox & Pearce (2018) also argue that 
young people are the most supportive generation of EU membership, caused by a 
combination of factors including their experience of the EU during their formative years, 
their relationships with domestic political institutions and their access to education. Their 
findings however contrast significantly with those of Kersan-Škabić & Tomić (2009) who 
concluded that the students’ population in Croatia was Eurosceptical because of the 
economic cost they expect Croatia would have with its entrance in the EU. The general 
consensus in the literature is that youngsters from Eastern European states are more critical 
than citizens from the west of Europe anyway but the results from the Croatian study does 
not stand by itself. The findings are reflected in a report of the TUI Foundation (2017) in 
which it is mentioned that three out of four young Europeans think that the core of the 
European Union is not its shared values, but rather economic cooperation.1 The opposite 
                                                     
1
 In the survey 6.000 young people aged between 16 and 26 in seven EU countries – France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK - were polled.  
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conclusions raise considerable doubt about the often thought belief that young people are 
more positive about European integration than older people.  
 
The opinion of students on the process of European integration will be analysed in relation 
with the influence of political and social actors. The relation with young people, such as 
students, is relevant for two reasons for which the earlier argument about this age cohort 
being in its formative years is extended by pointing to the piece of Niemi & Hepburn (1995). 
They argue that youth is a time or extraordinary psychological and social change and that 
these are also the years that society traditionally attempts to educate persons for civil 
participation. More so than during adulthood late teenagers and early twenties are 
vulnerable to external factors. The following research question is posed to analyse the 
relation: 
 
¨How does resistance / support of political and social actors regarding European integration 
influence the opinion of students on the process of European integration?¨ 
 
Students can take part in the research project if they comply with a few prerequisites. They 
need to be between 18 and 25 years old, live in the Netherlands, be enrolled in a Dutch 
education program and hold a nationality of one of the countries of the European Union. 
Alongside this relation three additional concepts are considered which are identity, political 
and economic considerations and the role of the media. This conceptualization leads to the 
following sub-questions: 
 
● How is the opinion of students about the European integration process influenced by 
political and economic considerations? 
● How is the opinion of students about the European integration process influenced by 
the identity of the respondent? 
● How is the opinion of students about the European integration process influenced by 
the role of the media? 
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2.2 Conceptual framework and hypotheses 
Following the research question and sub-questions the conceptual framework is shown on 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
On the right side the dependent variable, the opinion of the units of analysis on the process 
of European integration, is displayed. On the left side the main independent variable is 
shown and on the top and bottom the contextual variables influencing the opinion of the 
units of analysis are depicted. The arrows depict the direction of the relation between the 
variables. The operationalization of these concepts will follow in the next section. Before 
doing so however it is possible to formulate some hypotheses.  
 
Firstly considering economic and political considerations the two simple conclusions of 
Anderson & Reichert (1996) can be restated. I hypothesise that (1) individuals that think that 
their country benefits from EU membership are more positive about the European 
integration process and that (2) individuals who think that they personally benefit from EU 
membership are more positive about European integration. Regarding political efficacy I 
assume, following McEvoy (2016), that individuals who think that their actions are 
meaningful are more positive about European integration. Secondly, considering identity I 
believe that especially the age factor is influential for the personal identity. Despite earlier 
arguments providing a different point of view I do hypothesise here that the respondents 
think that their opinion about European integration is positively influenced by their young 
age. Because they are young they are expected to be more conscious about the benefits of 
integration. This hypothesis is based on the aforementioned Eurobarometer, which still 
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concludes that most young respondents are in favour of European integration. Following 
Hooghe & Marks (2008) most attention within the social identity category was directed 
towards national identity. In this regard I do hypothesise that those who have a stronger 
national identity will have a more negative opinion about European integration. The last 
factor is the role of the media. As cited in the chapter of Grimm et al. (2018) political 
scientist Ronald Inglehart (1970) argues that higher levels of cognitive mobilization are 
associated with support for European integration since increased access to information 
about the EU makes the organization appear less distant. Following this argumentation I 
suppose that the opinion of a respondent about European integration is positively 
influenced by a higher level of cognitive mobilization. I expect, in line with Hooghe & Marks 
(2008), that identity is the most important factor among the contextual variables. 
 
Also for the main independent variable, which consists of two categorizations as a 
distinction can be made between social and political actors and between resistance and 
support, hypotheses can be formulated. Firstly I do hypothesize that political actors have 
more influence on the opinion than social actors. Political actors not only receive more 
media attention but are also the decision makers in nation-states. Alongside, the 
expectation is that resistance of political and social actors is more visible and thus influential 
than support of those actors. Resisting actors are better known than their supportive 
adversaries and extreme voices are more often broadcasted in the media. Following the 
argument about the vulnerability of youth (Niemi & Hepburn, 1995) I do indeed expect that 
the opinion of a student is at least partly shaped by external actors. 
 
2.3 Operationalization  
The operationalization of the concepts displayed in Table 1 should, as a consequence of the 
fluidity of the research method, merely be seen as a guideline and not as an research 
approach which is set in stone. The semi-structured interviews will touch upon the variables 
and indicators mentioned in the operationalization but often delve into detail on some of 
the personal details or experiences of the interviewee. As a consequence all interviews will 
differ slightly but the main theme will always be the same.  
 
The concepts are operationalised as follows. The opinion concept is operationalised into the 
static and dynamic meanings of European integration derived from the article of Rose & 
Borz (2016). The resistance / support concept has the political and social actor dimensions 
following the conceptualization of Crespy & Verschueren (2009). For the economic and 
political considerations concept the economic dimension comes from Hooghe & Marks 
(2008) and the political efficacy from McEvoy (2016). The identity concept is divided into the 
two identity categories of Nario-Redmond et al. (2004) and the elements of the media 
concept come from the work of de Vreese (2007). 
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2.4 Research strategy and units of analysis  
Within the social sciences inductive and deductive research are the most often used 
research strategies. Basically deductive reasoning works from the general to the more 
specific, using hypotheses to test theory and then collecting data to falsify or verify the 
hypotheses. Inductive reasoning works the other way around as it uses the empirical 
outcomes to formulate hypotheses and come up with some sort of conclusion or theory. 
While the two strategies should, according to the handbook of Bryman (2008), be better 
thought of as tendencies rather than as a hard-and-fast distinction this report follows the 
deductive line of reasoning in general lines.  
 
Bryman (2008) also provides definitions for the different positions regarding epistemology 
and ontology. Following his work I argue that the study is grounded in an interpretive 
epistemological doctrine and occupies a constructionist ontological position. According to 
Bryman interpretivism respects the differences between people and the objects of the 
natural sciences and therefore allows the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of 
social action. About the constructivist ontological position Bryman argues, that it allows 
analysing that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by 
social actors.  
 
The report adopts a deductive line of reasoning in which semi-structured interviews with 
students are used to test the hypotheses. Some elements about the choice for this group 
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should be explained more extensively. First of all the choice for only students will be 
illustrated. Secondly it will be considered why only citizens of EU member states can take 
part in the survey and lastly the sampling issue will be clarified.  
 
In the Netherlands the statistical bureau CBS (2008) made a classification of education levels 
which divides the population on basis of their highest completed education level in low, 
middle and highly educated people. According to this classification low educated people 
only hold a degree at elementary school or at the lowest level of secondary education. It is 
often this group of people which, at the age of 18, already started working since education 
in the Netherlands is only mandatory until that age. By purposely considering students and 
not young people this group is excluded from the research project. Nonetheless, since the 
project employs a qualitative research method, the author is well-aware that the results 
cannot be generalized to the entire population of young people anyway. Practical reasons 
were decisive in this choice. In a similar research project (Ankum, 2016) of the author only 
nine percent of the participants in a questionnaire belonged to this low education group. 
Even while the results cannot be generalized to the entire population the opposite 
conclusions about the opinions of young people as found by research institutes as the 
PewResearchCenter (2016) and the TUI Foundation (2017) highlight the relevance of 
analysing this group. Indeed other researchers such as Kersan-Škabić & Tomić (2009) also 
conducted research under only students rather than the entire population of young people.  
 
The second element which has to be further explicated is the nationality of the 
interviewees. Only EU nationals are eligible to take part in the research project since I 
assume that people from other countries might not know enough about European 
integration to be able to formulate a well-developed opinion and assess what influences 
their opinion. A 2004-poll under 1000 randomly selected Americans for example showed 
that 77 percent of the respondents knew very little or nothing at all about the European 
Union (Gallup & Saad, 2004). While this might not be true for all students from non-EU 
countries it is assumed that the level of knowledge is at least lower in general. This can be 
illustrated by pointing to the difference between EU-nationals and persons from outside the 
Union. In an Eurobarometer (2017) survey ‘only’ 28 percent answered most questions 
wrong in a knowledge test about Europe.  
 
The last issue considered in this section is sampling, the selection of the respondents. The 
population of interest in this report are students which fulfil the prerequisites mentioned 
earlier. The size of the desired sample can depend on multiple factors such as the 
complexity of the interview, the heterogeneity of the population and practical reasons as 
time, money and accessibility (Box, 2014). The general rule however is that you continue 
interviewing until you have reached your saturation point, the moment at which you realize 
that no new answers are coming from your respondents anymore. Following the work of 
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Guest, Bunce & Johnson (2006) who found that 92 percent of the total set of codes that 
they ultimately developed occurred in the first twelve interviews, a total of twelve 
interviews will be taken as the minimal guideline. This number can also be linked with some 
of the other factors mentioned by Box (2014). Like my own approach Guest et al. (2006) 
used semi-structured interviews when they came up with the number. They argued that 
more interviews would be necessary if the approach would be open-ended. Elsewhere, 
Kuzel (1991) tied the number of interviews to sample heterogeneity, recommending six to 
eight interviews for a homogeneous sample and twelve to twenty to achieve maximum 
variation. Since I aim for maximum variation a total of twelve interviews is suitable as a 
minimal guideline.  
 
Alongside the size, the sampling technique is an important element. Sampling techniques 
are divided into two groups, probability and non-probability techniques. The main 
difference between the two groups is random selection. When using a probability technique 
units are randomly selected to help you select units that are similar to the population in 
your sample. Non-probability techniques rather rely on the subjective judgement of the 
researcher. Using the preferred option of a probability sampling technique for this research 
project proved to be not possible. Obtaining a random sample of the student population 
would not only be difficult for legal reasons but also because of practical concerns. Instead 
the study will apply a version of purposive sampling called heterogeneous sampling. 
Following Patton (2002) purposive sampling is defined as ¨a method in which you decide the 
purpose you want informants to serve, and you go out and find some¨. Heterogeneous 
sampling is a sampling technique used to capture a wide range of perspectives relating to 
the thing that you are interested in studying (Patton, 2002). For the purpose of this project I 
do aim at finding students who differ as much as possible in their opinion on the process of 
European integration. To achieve this goal the personal characteristics of possible 
respondents (age, gender, nationality) will be determined beforehand while I will as well ask 
about their satisfaction with European integration. Nonetheless this section should be 
concluded with the remark that, even when trying to be as heterogeneous as possible, the 
sample will be quite biased compared to a probability sample. 
 
2.5 Data collection and research method 
The semi-structured interview occupies a middle position when looking at the structure of 
an interview. A topic list with general questions and themes will be brought to the interview 
but the interviewer can explore certain themes in more detail than others. The remainder of 
this section will consider two elements of the data set. Firstly I explain how possible 
interviewees were approached and introduce the eventual sample. After that the structure 
of the interviews is explained by looking at the topic list and the corresponding list of codes 
in the qualitative analysis program Atlas.ti.  
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2.5.1 Data collection 
To reach out to possible respondents an introductory note about the research project was 
formulated which was distributed both online and offline. This note is added in Appendix 1 
and was written in both Dutch and English. Possible respondents were approached between 
the 7th and 28th of February 2018 and interviews were conducted in Dutch or English 
according to the language of preference of the interviewee. It was ensured that the 
questions on the both topic lists were strictly similar. An overview of the distribution 
channel, way of distribution, language in which was distributed and the person(s) who 
distributed is provided in Table 2. If available a link of the distribution post is added in the 
table as well.2 The table shows that predominantly social media channels were used to 
reach out the possible respondents. Alongside, messages were sent to friends and relatives, 
asking them if they knew any people who might want to participate. Offline, people were 
approached orally and by distributing the note as a flyer at university buildings. 
 
 
 
The first interview took place at the 16th of February and the last one at the 7th of March. 
In total fourteen interviews were conducted which is slightly more than the original goal of 
twelve. After twelve interviews I did not think however that saturation was reached which 
made me decide to distribute the note one last time and interview two more people. None 
of the interviewees was a close friend or relative of the author. Although I did know five of 
them before I was not aware of their opinion or political standpoints. In Table 3 the 
                                                     
2
 When other users of social media shared the note I am not able to add a link since these are not available. 
  
25 
background of all fourteen respondents who participated in the interviews is described. The 
table shows the respondent numbers, the language in which the interview was done, their 
answer to the question about satisfaction mentioned in the introductory note and the 
gender, age and nationality of each of the interviewees. The respondents are referred to 
using their aliases, which do reflect their personal background but are not their real names, 
in order to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees.  
 
 
 
During the selection process some of the flaws of qualitative research with a non-probable 
sample became apparent as I was only able to reach the desired heterogeneity on some 
aspects. I am for example satisfied with the gender divide as six of the respondents are male 
while at first it proved to be difficult to find male respondents. In the beginning it was also 
hard to find foreign respondents but after actively promoting my research by flyering in 
university buildings and through online messages I was able to find six foreign respondents. 
Of course I will not able to generalize to the population of the respective EU member states 
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but at least some perspectives other than the Dutch will be mentioned. On the downside 
the sample includes only participants which are either in university or in higher professional 
education. This suggests that the sample group will probably be more positive about 
European integration than when I would have used a random sample. Also, following the 
question about satisfaction I asked beforehand, people seem to be disproportionately 
positive about European integration. On average the interviewees rewarded their 
satisfaction about the EU with a 7.3 This grade is quite high compared with for instance the 
representative sample of the Eurobarometer (2018). On this bias I will extend in more 
length in the last chapter of this thesis.  
 
2.5.2 Data set description 
The interviews took between 29 and 50 minutes and were guided by an item list, either in 
Dutch or English, which is added in Appendix 2. The item list consists of both general 
questions and quotes of actors to spark the discussion. Quotes were shown to an 
interviewee only if deemed necessary. The questions on the item list were structured 
according to the operationalization. Before starting with an interview the interviewees were 
asked if they agreed with recording the conversation. Interviews were recorded using the 
mobile phone of the author and transcribed using the transcription program oTranscribe. 
The analysis of the interviews took place with the help of the qualitative analysis program 
Atlas.ti. Both open and listed coding were used to translate the outcomes of the interviews 
to tangible results. Listed codes correspond with the variables of the operationalization 
while open codes are themes which came up frequently during the interviews. The list of 
codes is displayed on Figure 2 on the following page and is further explained in Appendix 3. 
An example of a transcribed interview is available in Appendix 4. 
 
The codes relate closely to the empirical chapter, in Appendix 3 it is also mentioned which 
code groups are discussed in which section of the following chapter. When analysing one of 
the codes students were measured according to a short summary made by the interviewer. 
To provide an example for the code about age I wrote down that respondents 2, 5, 7, 8 and 
12 thought that age had some influence on the opinion of students while respondents 4 and 
11 thought it was not that important. Alongside, respondents 6, 10 and 11 made a 
statement about another frequent finding, the differences between generations. This 
approach was followed for all codes to ensure that the analysis would be an adequate 
reflection of the opinion of all respondents 
                                                     
3
 Two interviewees did not respond to the question about satisfaction 
  
27 
 
Figure 2: List of codes  
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Chapter 3: The opinion of students about the process of 
European integration 
In this chapter the results of the interviews are analysed. In the first section the relation 
between the main independent variable and the opinion of students about European 
integration is looked at. The second, third and fourth sections consider the contextual 
variables in relation with the opinion of students.  
 
3.1 Resistance and support and the opinion of students 
In the first chapter definitions were provided for political and social actors. The work of 
Wolfsfeld (2015) was used to define the category of political actors who ‘hold some 
measure of political authority and engage in activities which can have a significant influence 
on decisions, policies and outcomes’. Alongside, Stockinger (2005) defined the social actors 
category as ‘having a common cognitive reference frame and a specific competence for 
dealing with this frame’. Before turning to resistance or support of these groups it is 
considered if the interviewees see these groups of actors in a similar fashion as the theory.  
 
Defining social and political actors 
The group of political actors consists of high-level government officials and ministers but 
also, following the agency interpretation, political parties. In one of the interviews Elske was 
asked about who she thought when thinking about politics in the EU:  
 
¨First of all I think of Dutch political parties because you know from some of the parties what 
opinion they have about for example broadening of the European Union. I do not know that 
much about certain figures at an European level. Maybe Frans Timmermans or Donald Tusk 
but not really historical figures (Quote 1, Elske, 22, translated).¨ 4 
 
National political parties appeared most frequently when talking about political actors 
within the context of European integration. Most interviewees believe that what is 
happening on the European level has to be translated to the domestic level so that domestic 
actors still exercise the most influence. This conclusion was summarized by Nina: ¨who you 
listen to when it comes to European action would be Angela Merkel. You would not go to 
Jean-Claude Juncker and listen to his interviews because that is far less relevant to my 
personal understanding of what is happening. It is nice that there are EU laws but the way 
that they are enforced is a question of the local government (Quote 2, Nina, 20)¨. The 
conclusion of Nina is supported by other interviewees who made a clear statement about 
this subject. The definition of Wolfsfeld (2015) about actors with political authority is 
                                                     
4
 Translations of Dutch interview quotes are added in Appendix 5. 
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predominantly applicable to domestic political parties and individuals. Additionally only the 
best-known European politicians, such as Timmermans and Tusk, feature in the interviews.  
In contrast the group of social actors mentioned by the interviewees is more diverse. During 
the interviews it was already evident that not all respondents were thinking about the 
influence of specific social actors regarding European integration. Some mentioned they 
knew the two examples (Pegida and AEGEE) provided by the interviewer but did not know 
other social organizations which influenced their opinion while others came up with only 
one additional organization. The general line was summarized by Sebastian who responded 
to the question about the role of civil society organizations ¨almost any societal 
organization that can offer enough information to the Commission. Due to inadequacy of the 
staff of the EU it needs to rely on external sources of information in order for the policies to 
gain legitimacy. It depends very much on the policy field that is being discussed (Quote 3, 
Sebastian, 23)¨. Due to the diverse group of social actors and the lack of responses of some 
of the interviewees on this topic it is however difficult to relate the outcomes to the theory 
of Stockinger (2005).  
 
Resisting or supporting actors?  
The second step in this section should be to consider if resistance or support of the actors is 
more apparent and what the reason behind it is. Resistance of political actors can, according 
to Szczerbiak & Taggert (2018), develop for ideological-programmatic or strategic-tactical 
reasons while Fitzgibbon (2013) adds interest representation and a lack of political 
opportunities for resistance of social actors. For support Guerra (2018) notes that higher 
levels of cognitive mobilization, a positive cost-benefit analysis, satisfaction with national 
democracy and an inclusive identity are associated with a positive view about European 
integration. 
 
Firstly considering support it seems that support of social actors predominantly comes from 
actors which gain in an economic sense of European integration. Elske for example 
mentioned that ¨it is very attractive for companies, especially in an economic sense, it is 
easier to move from one country to another and you do not have to pay import duties 
(Quote 4, Elske, 22, translated)¨. While other interviewees made some prerequisites for a 
company to be positive about integration, for example that is has to be export-oriented, 
companies were noted as the most positive social actors. Other social actors that were 
sporadically mentioned were non-governmental organizations and universities. Support of 
companies can be associated with the positive cost-benefit analysis mentioned by Guerra 
(2018) while for the other actors the reasons vary from ideological determinants to 
cognitive mobilization.  
 
Support of political actors can come from national and European actors as the interviewees 
thought that most actors want to show that the EU is a good thing. Support is however seen 
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to be more dominant in Brussels than in the member states. Freek described that ¨I think 
that the European Commission and Parliament are in general more positive. The Council, 
national parliaments and the citizens have a diverse opinion but tend to be more negative 
(Quote 5, Freek, 24, translated)¨. Support in the nation-states is thought to be found with 
political parties which have a liberal ideology such as VVD and D’66 in the Netherlands. 
Some respondents see the EU as an economic project and argue that parties favouring free 
trade such as VVD and D’66 align most with it. Interesting is that for supportive actors it is 
especially actors at an agency scale level, rather than individuals, that are thought to be 
positive.  
 
Turning to resistance the group of actors resisting European integration is more diverse than 
the supportive group. For social actors no specific category of actors can however be seen as 
exemplary. Most reactions of the respondents about social actors were again provoked by 
the interviewer by showing the two examples on the topic list. Opposing political actors 
seem to be more visible. On the national level it is especially the parties on the fringes which 
stand out. Nina mentions the right-wing parties ¨I think that there are nationalistic parties, 
which are on the rise, like the AfD or the FN or Geert Wilders. They confront us with the 
benefits of the EU (Quote 6, Nina, 20)¨ while Sebastian also mentions the role of left-wing 
parties as the Greek party Syriza in the austerity debates. According to Nina, Sebastian and 
other interviewees the political actors arguing against further integration made the benefits 
of the EU more visible. The ‘anti-voice’ as Freek conceptualizes it led to a more tense 
discussion about integration and made proponents of integration think about the 
advantages of integration. In this sense, for at least half of the interviewees, a relation 
between resistance of actors and a positive opinion about integration can be noted.  
 
In contrast to supportive actors for the resisting category specific individuals such as Geert 
Wilders, Marine le Pen or Charles de Gaulle were frequently mentioned by the interviewees. 
Returning to the categories of Szczerbiak & Taggert (2018) & Fitzgibbon (2013) both 
ideological and strategic reasons can be recorded when the interviewees talked about 
resistance of political actors. Ideological reasons for example in the reasoning of Syriza in 
the austerity debates and strategic reasons when talking about voting for a party which 
seats in a specific political group in the EP. Both factors of Fitzgibbon (2013) also return in 
the reasoning of the interviewees, for example when talking about Pegida, which is seen as 
‘group of dissatisfied people with no political alternative’ by Sander. 
 
Resisting actors are thought to be more visible and influential than social actors. Paula 
summarizes the line of reasoning voiced by most respondents ¨I think the anti-people are 
more successful because they are heard more, I have never heard of the two pro-integration 
examples which you mentioned (Quote 7, Paula, 19)¨. In a few interviews the role of the 
media, to which I will return later, is also noted in this regard. The media would broadcast 
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extreme voices more often than moderate parties because this attracts more attention. 
While resisting actors are found to be more influential this does however not directly say 
something about their influence on the opinion of students. This relation will be the next 
element that is considered.  
 
Influence on the opinion of students 
Before starting with the empirical work of this project I hypothesized that resistance would 
be more important than support. In the previous paragraphs this hypothesis was confirmed. 
Additionally I expected that political actors would be more important than social actors and 
that the opinion of students would at least be partly influenced by external forces. These 
last two assumptions will be tested in the last part of this section.  
 
Regarding the first assumption, the balance between social and political actors, I can 
highlight different arguments after analysing the data. Turning to Paula first it can be argued 
that political actors are more important ¨I feel like political parties are more effective 
because we have elections so we have to vote. Than we start to see which parties we align 
with more. I feel like for civil society, their main aim is to affect the government rather than 
change our mind (Quote 8, Paula, 19).¨ On the other hand there were a few respondents 
who are not interested in politics and valued social actors as more important ¨I am not 
politically oriented, I think politics is more like a game. Civil society organizations are more 
personal, people act out of their own interest. (Quote 9, Sophie, 25, translated)¨. The general 
consensus in the interviews however seems to be more aligned with the opinion of Paula 
than with the opinion of Sophie. A few respondents acknowledged the role that social actors 
can play in the multi-level governance system but most pointed to political actors when 
answering to the question about which actors shape the process of European integration. In 
the final question, when interviewees were asked about the influence of the several factors 
on their opinion, one third of the respondents mentioned political actors as influential while 
only Sophie argued that social actors were actually influential for her opinion. The 
hypothesis, more influence of political than of social actors, can be confirmed.  
 
The last hypothesis was about the general influence of social and political actors on the 
opinion of students. The hypothesis can be confirmed partly but in a slightly different 
manner as expected. At first sight I assumed that students would become more negative 
when confronted with resistance and more positive when confronted with support. This first 
assumption can however be dismissed as multiple respondents mentioned that they instead 
became more positive about integration as a consequence of opposition. Nina summarizes 
the reasoning behind this relation: ¨when Pegida started demonstrating I started to have 
stronger political opinions. Confronting me with Islamophobia made me research the good 
parts of it, of the Islam. I wanted to be more embracing to the people who experienced hate 
from this kind of groups. In that way it helped me develop my own opinion (Quote 10, Nina, 
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20)¨. Sophie validated her statement by pointing to Pegida demonstrations in Utrecht and 
mentioning that ‘it made her wondering what their motives were’. Sander talks about the 
influence of both social and political actors on the opinion about European integration: 
¨Pegida and political parties which hit on the EU, especially extreme-right and nationalistic 
parties show people that something might have to change in the EU but that it should not be 
as extreme as they articulate. I a certain way you thus get a more positive view of the EU. 
You become stronger as you think about ‘us against those weirdos’ (Quote 11, Sander, 23, 
translated)¨. The opposite influence on the opinion, resistance leading to positivism, 
features frequently in the interviews, and is half of the answer to the hypothesis.  
 
While some respondents did point to this opposite influence others did clearly dismiss the 
influence of other actors on their own opinion. While actors often provide ‘food for thought’ 
they do not influence or change the opinion of most of the respondents. Sebastian and 
Mathijs both articulate this conclusion in a slightly different manner: ¨I would not say that 
they have a direct impact. I observe how they relate to the EU, how they behave in the EU 
but I try to formulate my opinion based on observations, by myself and not based on any 
party's or a certain politicians view (Quote 12, Sebastian, 23)¨ and ¨I formulate my opinions 
from several sources and what you hear on a daily basis. I do not lean to a certain party or 
person (Quote 13, Mathijs, 22, translated)¨. For these two and most of the other 
respondents social and political actors play a role in the background. Respondents collect 
information that actors provide but it does not directly change their opinion about 
European integration which they base on other aspects. The relation between resistance 
and support of political and social actors and the opinion of students on European 
integration is thus twofold. On the one hand some respondents became more positive 
about integration because of resistance of actors. On the other hand some respondents see 
resistance or support as ‘food for thought’ and base their opinion on other aspects. 
Approximately one third of the interviewees aligns with the first conclusion while the rest 
leans to the second conclusion.  
 
3.2 Considerations and the opinion of students 
The political and economic considerations were identified following the work of Hooghe & 
Marks (2008) but were also mentioned by Guerra (2018). The conclusions of Anderson & 
Reichert (1996) led to the hypotheses about economic considerations that personal benefits 
or benefits for the country in which a person lives would lead to a more positive opinion 
about European integration. Looking at the benefits for the country first, Lea mentions that 
it has led to a more positive opinion for her: ¨I do not know how it has been here but for 
Estonia it has been good because it brought in new businesses. And the money as well, we 
used to have our own money and now we have the Euro. This has made it easier as well, to 
make business and to be part of Europe (Quote 14, Lea, 25)¨. The same line of reasoning is 
voiced by other respondents. Marloes points to the fact that the Netherlands is not a large 
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country and that it benefits from the size of the EU. Mathijs extends on this argument and 
points out that for larger countries such as France and Germany the economic advantages 
might be less significant as the national economy is large enough. The hypothesis about a 
more positive attitude when you consider your country to benefit can however be 
confirmed. A positive image about the economic image leads to more positivism and a 
negative image to more negativism.  
 
Personal benefits are more important than benefits for the country and are by most 
respondents even considered more meaningful than the opinion of other actors. Teodor 
from Bulgaria summed up the general argument in his answer to the final question of the 
interview: ¨to answer this in a personal way, for me the greatest thing is that I have free 
travel and that the university fees for European students are five times smaller than for 
people from outside the EU. I know that we have been talking about the bigger picture but 
European integration is why I am here (Quote 15, Teodor, 19)¨. As the interviewees regularly 
pointed out that everybody has ‘their own interest in mind’ most of them mentioned that 
their socio-economic background is one of the main influences on their opinion. At least half 
of the interviewees indicated that economic reasons were (one of the) most important 
reasons influencing their opinion. The second conclusion of Anderson & Reichert (1996) can 
also be confirmed. Some interviewees noted that they are more positive because of their 
privileged socio-economic position and that they would be more negative if the EU would 
cost them more.  
 
Turning to the political field I hypothesized that respondents who think that their actions are 
meaningful are more positive about European integration. The results on this subject show 
mixed results. A first reason for this however is that at least half of the respondents were 
not fully aware of the functioning of the EU and because of that they were not able to 
analyse if the efficacy influenced their opinion about it. Among the respondents that could 
answer the question about this topic some thought that the EU is democratic enough such 
as Teodor who compared the situation in the EU with the situation in his home country 
Bulgaria and Elske who indicated that democratic accountability is one of the core values of 
the EU. In contrast others mentioned that there indeed is a ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU. 
Freek for instance indicated that the dysfunctioning of the European Parliament leads to a 
lot of frustration about the EU, especially for people who are already negative about the 
Union. The judgement of the respondents does however not seem to have much influence 
on the opinion about European integration: 
 
¨I would not say I am more negative, I do not think this is a good development. But on 
the other hand this is not a reason to leave the EU. I think this is something which can be 
adjusted by some Treaty changes, it would be unwise to leave or dismantle the EU just 
because of some smaller flaws which can be fixed (Quote 16, Sebastian).¨ 
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¨I can see the point but at the same time I understand that there has to be some rules, 
some regulations and order, that goes into the processes. Of course it is not perfect but I 
still think the benefits outweigh the negatives such as being bureaucratic (Quote 17, Eleni).¨ 
 
Both Sebastian and Eleni articulate that, although they see some flaws in the design of the 
EU, their opinion about the EU did not become more negative because of that. The 
hypothesis about the meaningfulness of the actions can however not be confirmed based 
on results. Rather than respondents who thought that their actions were meaningful being 
more positive it can be concluded that other factors, such as the personal background and 
economic considerations, are more important and outweigh the influence of political 
considerations. These considerations were conceptualized here as political efficacy which is 
different as a political ideology. An interviewee can also identify as member of a certain 
political group which is part of the social identity category treated in the next section.  
 
3.3 Identity and the opinion of students 
The identity variable is a broad factor consisting of the personal and social identity 
categories. Regarding the personal identity category I assumed that age would be an 
important variable and that respondents are likely to be positive because they are young. 
Alongside, the social identity variable was thought to be predominantly related with 
national identity. Respondents with a stronger national identity were expected to be more 
negative about European integration. Along these two a lot of different factors, education 
level, family, social contacts and social status were indicated by the respondents. I will limit 
myself to the general conclusions and most significant exceptions per factor.  
 
Age 
The first factor under the personal identity category was age. Respondents were asked if 
their age had influence on their opinion about European integration and if so, why they 
thought it had an influence. The majority of the respondents indeed indicated that their 
young age made them positive about European integration. Positivism was especially 
related with personal benefits which was expressed by Lea: ¨I think the main difference was, 
when we talk about the EU for example, that the older generation was more against it. 
Younger people have the opportunity and the chances to study and travel abroad (Quote 18, 
Lea)¨. Most respondents articulate that younger people are in general more positive than 
older people but the generational divide is not seen as the most important element. Several 
respondents express that there are also young people who are negative about European 
integration and point to their socio-economic position for their positivism. Three 
respondents also wondered if the habituation to the comforts of the EU make the younger 
generation more sceptical because they did not experience the horrors of the past.  
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The difference with other generations noted by some respondents. Nina for instance 
articulates that she experiences a difference between the opinion of her parents’ generation 
and the generation of her grandparents ¨I would rather talk to young people or really old 
people than my parents’ generation. Because they do not really know what it was before 
(Quote 19, Nina)¨. The line of reasoning of Nina is voiced by other respondents. This finding 
is noteworthy since it extends on earlier quantitative work about the generational divide. An 
advantage of qualitative research such as this project is that it can apply nuances to ‘hard’ 
quantitative results. Reflecting on the hypothesis I can however partly confirm that younger 
people are more positive about European integration than older people. This confirmation 
however comes with some nuances as it also depends on the circles in which you spend 
time, in the more educated circles people are usually pro-European. 
 
Education level 
The second factor within the personal identity category is the education level. The main 
conclusion evolving from the empirical data is simple: if a person was higher educated he or 
she was more positive about European integration. A secondary conclusion is however more 
interesting to analyse. At least half of the respondents mentioned that because of the things 
they learned during their studies they are less receptive to influence of political and social 
actors. Pien expressed this attitude: ¨I think that only more knowledge gathered during my 
studies would change my opinion. This is academic knowledge which I can use to formulate 
my opinion. This is not the case for information from television, when there are just people 
shouting things (Quote 20, Pien, translated)¨. This however also has to do with the type of 
study of the respondent as it were mostly the respondents studying something related with 
politics who expressed this opinion. For them education can be seen as a mediating factor 
between the attitude of other actors and their own opinion about European integration. 
Regarding education I do conclude that higher educated respondents are more positive 
about European integration and that well-informed students are less receptive to the 
influence of others. It should however be noted that, due to the lack of low educated 
students, this conclusion should be taken with a grain of salt. 
 
Family and other social contacts 
The third and fourth factors were family, also seen as nurture, the way a person grew up, 
and other social contacts. Between the factors major similarities exist. For both some 
respondents mentioned that these social ties are important. This was however more so for 
family ties than for other social ties as eight respondents talked about the family influence 
and four about other social ties. The difference was clearly expressed by Mathijs who 
mentioned: ¨personally I think my parents had a huge influence. On a later age I also took 
the opinion of acquaintances and friends into account because you start formulating an own 
opinion later in your life (Quote 21, Mathijs, translated)¨. Some respondents expressed that 
they talked about the EU with their relatives and that it led to a ‘pragmatic’ or ‘conservative’ 
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view on European integration. The ties, both family and other ties, were however for only 
one respondent the most important factor influencing their opinion. Like education level 
and the next factor, social status, social ties, are however part of the personal background 
which multiple actors mentioned as the most important element influencing the opinion.  
 
Social Status 
The last factor under the personal identity category is social status, which is related with the 
socio-economic position mentioned in the previous section. Earlier I confirmed the 
assumptions of Anderson & Reichert (1996) about the economic benefits which associate 
with the economic part of the position. The social part is explained by Sander:  
 
¨After pre-university education you start studying on the university and in most instances 
you participate in the student life. You start living in Amsterdam, most of the students live 
there, and become part of a fraternity. You do not encounter any obstacles which leads to a 
positive image about the political situation, about the EU (Quote 22, Sander, 23, 
translated).¨ 
 
Sander explains that a strong socio-economic position leads to a positive opinion about 
European integration as you are satisfied with the current situation. On the other hand 
persons with a weaker position would like to change the situation and are more negative 
about integration. The explanation of Sander aligns with the utilitarian model explained 
earlier based on the work of Grimm et al. (2018). Most of the interviewees indeed indicated 
that they have a positive opinion about European integration because they have a strong 
socio-economic position. They also reflected on those with a weaker socio-economic 
position which might be more negative about integration. Since there is however a strong 
difference between self-identification and identification of others no far-reaching 
statements can be made about the relation between a weak position and negativism about 
integration.  
 
Some respondents conceptualize the social status and the previous elements in the personal 
identity category as their ‘personal background’. Conceptualizations vary but the personal 
background can be seen as a combination between the education level, the way a person 
grew up and their socio-economic status while some respondents also incorporate their age. 
Eleni expresses why she thinks her personal background is the most important element 
influencing her opinion: ¨I think it makes it makes the situation very obvious to me, I can 
directly see the benefits or the disadvantages of being in the EU which directly affects my 
opinion (Quote 23, Eleni, 25)¨. At least three quarters of the interviewees considered a 
conceptualization of their personal background as the most important element influencing 
their opinion about European integration.  
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Social Identity 
Group memberships were not often mentioned by the interviewees. Except from a national 
identity no other group memberships could be noted. None of the respondents identified as 
for example a member of a religious community which had a influence on their opinion. 
Turning to national identity I assumed earlier that respondents with a strong national 
identity would be more negative about European integration. Based on the results from the 
interviews this hypothesis can however be rejected. The few respondents that articulated a 
strong national identity did not see their national identity as an alternative to an European 
identity. Sometimes this was because of security interests as Lea from Estonia for example 
mentioned that ‘it is nice to have Europe behind our back when confronted with Russian 
aggression’. In other instances a respondent was supportive about European integration 
because of other elements and did not think that his or her national interests were hurt by 
European integration. It however seems that the bias in the sample plays a role as none of 
the respondents was opposing European integration per se.  
 
3.4 The role of the media and the opinion of students 
The last factor thought to influence the opinion of students is the role of the media. De 
Vreese (2007) was cited who introduced two elements, the pervasiveness of the strategic 
news frame and political sophistication. The second factor was linked to the term cognitive 
mobilization of Inglehart (1970). I assumed that the opinion of a respondent about 
European integration is positively influenced by a higher level of cognitive mobilization. The 
pervasiveness of the news frame relates to the difference between the influence of 
subjective and of objective news. First of all the relation between the codes associated with 
the role of the media and the education variable should however be noted. A correlation 
exists between a higher education level and a higher level of cognitive mobilization. The role 
of the media however goes behind only education. While information during your study can 
help you acquire more political skills this does not directly translate into a better 
understanding of the news frame. Turning to the pervasiveness of the news frame first 
Marloes argues that the type of news the media broadcasts is of influence: ¨I think that the 
media have some influence, maybe not directly, but if when it shows positive or negative 
news it can have an indirect influence (Quote 24 Marloes, 22, translated)¨. Marloes did not 
mention objective news framing but rather talked about the type of subjectivism. This type 
of reasoning is resonated by several other respondents, an extraordinary amount of 
negative news items would lead to more negativism. The difference between objective and 
subjective news seems only visible for respondents who have some background in 
communication studies. Lea and Eleni, both communication studies students, were critically 
aware of the differences between factual truths and rhetoric or news items.  
 
Your interpretation of the news however also hugely depends on your personal background 
which was introduced in the previous section. Freek illustrates this when I asked him about 
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the influence of social organizations as Pegida on his opinion: ¨Pegida is an organization 
which I do not identify with. I rather distance myself from them, but I again do that from a 
certain personal frame. I identify myself as pro-European so if I see something from the PVV 
or Pegida I already have a certain interpretation of that (Quote 25, Freek, 23, translated).¨ 
Like Freek several respondents mentioned that they frame news according to their own 
background. Extending this argument I find some evidence for the cognitive mobilization 
factor. None of the respondents argued that they became more positive about European 
integration as a consequence of more cognitive mobilization but negativism about European 
integration is according to some respondents related with a lack of cognitive mobilization. 
This statement is however questionable as there is a clear difference between respondents 
reflecting on their own opinion and their perception of what affects other people’s opinions. 
Since none of the respondents actually mentioned that they were more negative because of 
a lack of cognitive mobilization I do not unequivocally make this argument but rather bring it 
up and call for more research on this relation.  
 
The hypothesis about this variable, a higher level of cognitive mobilization leading to more 
positivism about integration, should however be rejected, instead, lower levels of 
mobilization of others can lead to more negativism. Following the work of de Vreese (2007) 
the argument about the influence of the pervasiveness of the news frame can be extended 
by pointing to the framing of the individual as a consequence of their personal background. 
For the opinion about European integration the role of the media is however limited. As 
Freek already illustrated most respondents formulated their opinion based on other 
elements and frame news items accordingly. Also, because the respondents had sufficient 
political skills, cognitive mobilization was for themselves not found to be important.  
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Conclusion and discussion 
In this research project an answer was formulated to the question: ‘How does resistance 
and support of political and social actors regarding European integration influence the 
opinion of students on the process of European integration?’ To do so fourteen semi-
structured interviews were conducted with students from EU member states studying in the 
Netherlands. Next to resistance and support of both groups of actors three additional 
factors were examined, political and economic considerations, identity and the role of the 
media.  
 
Following the results the personal background of a respondent is seen as the most 
important element influencing the opinion about European integration. Conceptualizations 
of the personal background vary but most consist of a combination between the education 
level, the way a person grew up, socio-economic status and sometimes age. Twelve of the 
fourteen respondents noted that their personal background is (one of) the most important 
elements while resistance and support of actors was noted by only four actors. The 
influence was interestingly enough found in resistance of actors leading to a more positive 
opinion of respondents. A third influential factor was economic considerations related with 
the utilitarian model which three respondents noted as (one of) the most important 
elements. The other factors, political considerations, social identity and the role of the 
media were of lesser importance and the associated hypotheses had to be rejected. A clear 
difference between respondents reflecting on their own opinion and their perception of 
what affects other people’s opinions can however be recorded. Since respondents were 
more positive anyhow they ascribed to certain positions and were less sensitive to 
resistance leading to a more negative opinion. Instead they noted that these types of 
negative influences can be found among less educated ‘other’ students and young people. 
 
The qualitative research project showed that resistance of actors is more important than 
support and that political actors outweigh social actors. Students were however less 
vulnerable to external influence than expected as for only one third of the respondents this 
was the most important element. Of the additional variables identity was indeed recorded 
as the most important factor while economic considerations were the second most 
influential. Notwithstanding the dispersion in opinions and the growth of resistance against 
European integration students in most instances still dismiss external factors as ‘people 
shouting things at television’ and formulate their opinion based on their own background.  
 
The structure of this research project should however be reflected upon. In his book Bryman 
(2009) introduced three criteria, reliability, replication and validity, to evaluate research 
projects in the social sciences. The first two criteria were sufficiently addressed throughout 
the thesis but the design has flaws regarding validity and especially regarding external 
validity, whether study results can be generalised beyond the particular research context. 
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Due to the non-purposive sample method the eventual group of respondents is not 
representative of the entire population. The respondents were highly educated and more 
positive about European integration when compared with a representative sample. Further 
research on this topic should thus further explore the conclusions of this project by 
conducting interviews with lower educated students and comparing the results. Another 
interesting angle can be to compare member states which have strong anti-European voices 
and those where integration is still widely accepted.  
 
The findings of this project can however still fulfil its role within the body of literature on 
youth and Euroscepticism. Recent projects such as the chapters of Grimm et al. (2018) and 
Guerra (2018) adopt a quantitative approach towards the subject which this qualitative 
project can supplement. The conclusion that, at least for highly educated students, the 
dispersion in opinion after Maastricht, does not play a significant role, indeed reinforces the 
argument of Guerra that the EU is still retaining support from young people as long as it 
fulfils its expectations regarding the (socio-)economic situation. Other elements mentioned 
in the quantitative chapters such as cognitive mobilization and satisfaction with democracy 
are however not found in this research project which allows room for further research to 
explore these contrasting findings. The contextualization of the project by firstly examining 
the processes leading to the current situation, the diversified opinions about integration 
after Maastricht, also contributes to a better understanding of the current situation.  
 
Along further exploring quantitative results this study should be interpreted as a new step 
towards an in-depth understanding of the opinion of youth about European integration. In 
contrast to my expectations formulated after analysing Niemi & Hepburn (1995) external 
factors were for my group of respondents not that important as internal factors such as the 
personal background. This awareness can be a bright spot for European policymakers, who 
seem to retain support of highly educated students as long as the EU meets its socio-
economic demands. Before we can however really determine whether actors resisting the 
ever closer union, such as Pegida or Front National, have a strong influence on students this 
research project should be extended to less highly educated students.  
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Appendices 
In Appendix 1 the introductory note which invited people to take part in the research 
project is displayed. Appendix 2 consists of the topic lists in both Dutch and English. In 
Appendix 3 an explanation of the codes used in Atlas.ti is provided, Appendix 4 holds a 
transcript of one of the interview and the last Appendix contains of the original Dutch 
interview quotes which were translated in the text.  
 
Appendix 1: Introductory notes 
These introductory notes were used to approach people, both online and offline, to 
participate in the research project. Depending on the situation the English, Dutch or both 
versions were used. The channels used to distribute the note were mentioned earlier. 
----------------------------- 
Beste medestudent, 
 
Ik ben Lars Ankum en volg op het moment de master Europese studies aan de Universiteit 
Leiden. Momenteel schrijf ik mijn scriptie over weerstand tegen Europese integratie. De 
laatste tijd is dit verzet duidelijk naar voren gekomen, onder andere in het referendum in 
Groot-Brittanië en in het Oekraïne-referendum in Nederland.  
 
Voor mijn scriptie ben ik op zoek naar studenten (18-25) afkomstig uit de Europese Unie en 
momenteel studerend in Nederland voor een interview over Europese integratie. In het 
interview zal ik vragen naar de invloed van andere actoren (personen en organisaties) op 
jouw mening over Europese integratie. Daarnaast ben ik ook benieuwd of jouw eigen 
identiteit en overwegingen over zaken zoals de economische situatie in de EU van invloed 
zijn op jouw mening. 
 
Het interview duurt ongeveer een half uur en kan plaatsvinden op een locatie en moment 
van uw keuze. Uiteraard wordt de deelname zeer gewaardeerd en zal die beloond worden 
met een versnapering op kosten van deze dankbare interviewer. De resultaten van het 
interview zullen worden geanonimiseerd en worden enkel gebruikt voor dit 
onderzoeksproject. Als je wilt deelnemen kan je reageren op dit bericht of een e-mail sturen 
naar l.a.ankum@umail.leidenuniv.nl. Ik vraag je ook om te vermelden hoe tevreden je 
momenteel bent over Europese integratie (op een schaal van 1 tot 10). Belangrijk om aan te 
geven is dat mocht jij mij toevallig goed kennen de kans dat je wordt uitgekozen voor het 
interview niet heel groot is. Toch staat het je uiteraard vrij om te reageren.  
 
Ik wil je bij voorbaat danken voor jouw tijd en hoop je spoedig te mogen begroeten!  
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Dear fellow student, 
 
My name is Lars Ankum and I am a student European Union studies at Leiden University. 
Currently I am writing my Master's thesis about resistance against European integration. 
During the last couple of years resistance has been quite apparent in the European Union, 
visible for example in the Brexit referendum and in the referendum about Ukraine in the 
Netherlands.  
 
For the thesis I am looking for students (18-25) from countries of the European Union who 
are currently studying in the Netherlands to interview about European integration. In the 
interview you will be asked about the influence of other actors (people and organizations) 
on your opinion about European integration. Also I will question the influence of your 
identity and wider considerations such as the economic situation on your opinion about the 
integration process. 
 
The interview will take approximately half a hour and can take place on a location and date 
of your preference. Of course you will be highly rewarded with coffee or thee at the 
expense of this grateful interviewer. The results of the interview will be made anonymous 
and are only used for this research project. Please respond to this message or send an e-
mail to l.a.ankum@umail.leidenuniv.nl if you are willing to participate. I also ask you to 
mention how satisfied you currently are about European integration (on a scale from 1 to 
10). Important to add is that if I am very familiar with you it is not very likely that you will be 
invited to take part in the research project. Nonetheless you are of course allowed to 
respond to this invitation.  
 
I thank you in advance for your time and hope to see you soon! 
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Appendix 2: Topic lists 
Like the introductory note two versions of the topic list were available, one in English and 
one in Dutch. Eventually six of the interviews were kept in English and eight in Dutch.  
 
Dutch: Oppositie tegen Europese integratie - Itemlijst 
 
Introductie (13 vragen in totaal) 
- Welkom heten en danken voor deelname 
- Regels en opname (anoniem, stoppen wanneer je wilt, geen foute antwoorden) 
- Voorstellen respondent (leeftijd en nationaliteit, geen NAAM) en jezelf 
- Introductie onderwerp: weerstand tegen Europese integratie en mening over EU integratie 
 
¨Hoe heeft de weerstand / support van politieke en sociale actoren aangaande Europese 
integratie invloed op de mening van studenten op het proces van Europese integratie? 
 
Historische vragen 
● Wat weet je van het proces van Europese integratie? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Denk je dat de Europese Unie nu anders is dan in het verleden? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Wie (personen en organisaties) hadden invloed op Europese integratie en hoe deden zij 
dat?  
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● Wat voor actoren waren positief over het proces van Europese integratie / wat voor 
actoren waren hier negatief over?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
What fragmenten die getoond kunnen worden 
 
Marine le Pen - Everyone understands the European Union is a failure. It has not kept any of 
its promises - in particular about prosperity, security - and, worst of all, has put us under a 
guardianship.  
 
 
 Francois Mitterand - ¨Nationalism is War¨. 
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Pegida -  ¨Stop Islamisation of Europe¨ 
 
 
Student Organization AEGEE - ¨Some call it Europe, we call it home¨ 
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Invloed van actoren 
● Hebben deze politieke actoren invloed op jouw mening over Europese integratie? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Hebben deze sociale actoren invloed op jouw mening over Europese integratie? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economische / politieke situatie 
● Heb jij profijt van het EU-lidmaatschap van jouw land? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Heeft de economische situatie invloed op jouw mening over Europese integratie? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Stem jij in verkiezingen voor het Europees Parlement? 
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● Heeft de politieke legitimiteit van de Europese Unie invloed op jouw mening over 
Europese integratie?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identiteit 
● Heeft jouw achtergrond als een …… invloed op jouw mening over Europese integratie?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Heeft jouw leeftijd invloed op jouw mening over Europese integratie? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusie 
● Wordt jouw mening over Europese integratie beïnvloed door de mening van anderen, de 
economische en/of politieke situatie of jouw identiteit (of allen)?  
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English: Resistance against European Integration - Item List 
 
Introduction (13 questions in total) 
- Warm welcome and thanks for participation 
- Rules and recording (anonymous, stop when you want, no wrong answers) 
- Introduction respondent (age, nationality) and yourself 
- Introduction subject: Euroscepticism and your personal opinion on European integration 
 
¨How does resistance / support of political and social actors regarding European integration 
influence the opinion of students on the process of European integration?¨ 
-- 
 
Start with historical questions 
● What do you know about the process of European integration?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Do you think the European Union is now different than in the past?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Who (people and/or other actors) influenced the development of the European Union 
and how did they do so?  
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● What kind of actors were positive about the process of European integration / and what 
kind of actors were negative about this process?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If necessary some fragments can be shown 
 
Marine le Pen - Everyone understands the European Union is a failure. It has not kept any of 
its promises - in particular about prosperity, security - and, worst of all, has put us under a 
guardianship.  
 
 
 Francois Mitterand - ¨Nationalism is War¨. 
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Pegida -  ¨Stop Islamisation of Europe¨ 
 
 
Student Organization AEGEE - ¨Some call it Europe, we call it home¨ 
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Influence of actors 
● Do these political actors influence your opinion about the process of European 
integration? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Do these social actors influence your opinion about the process of European integration?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic / political situation 
● Do you think you benefit from the EU membership of your nation-state?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Does the economic situation influence your opinion about European integration? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Do you vote in elections for the European Parliament? 
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● Does the political legitimacy of the European Union influence your opinion about 
European integration? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identity 
● Do you think your background as a …….. influences your opinion about European 
integration?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
● Do you think your age influences your opinion about European integration?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
● Is your opinion about European integration influenced by the position of others, 
economic / political considerations, individual characteristics (or all)?  
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Appendix 3: Explanation codes Atlas.ti 
The codification process was based on the conceptual 
framework presented earlier in this report. Some of the 
codes were however added later according to open 
coding.  
 
The A-codes are derived from the dependent variable 
of the thesis. The categorization is ranging from 
positive to negative opinion. General statements about 
of a respondent about European integration were 
given code A while subjective statements got one of 
the subcodes. The dependent variable was discussed in 
all sections of Chapter 3 
 
The B- and C-codes are associated with the main 
independent variable. The categorization here varies 
from resistance to support of political and social actors 
according to the conceptual framework. General and 
subjective statements were divided in the same way as 
mentioned for A-codes. These code groups were 
discussed in section 3.1. 
 
The D- and E-codes are related with the considerations 
contextual variable. The categorization again varies 
from positive to negative. Positive statements about 
for instance the economy received code D1 for 
instance. General statements received standard code D 
or E. These code groups were discussed in section 3.2. 
 
The F-codes are related with the contextual identity variable but is the first group for which 
open coding was used. Since the identity variable can be interpreted broadly I used open 
coding to come up with the subcodes. Accordingly these five categories were mentioned 
frequently in the interviews and were added to the list. Code F3 consists of family relation 
and the influence of nurture on the opinion. This code group was discussed in section 3.3. 
 
The G- and H-codes lastly were the result of both open and listed coding. The G- and H- 
general codes were already formulated before starting with the coding process but the G1- 
and H1-subcodes were added later because these subjects were frequently mentioned by 
the interviewees. The G-codes were discussed in section 3.4 and the H-codes in section 3.3. 
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Appendix 4: Transcript one of the interviews 
An transcript of one of the interviews is added as an example. The other transcripts can be 
requested by contacting the author via e-mail (l.a.ankum@umail.leidenuniv.nl).  
------------ 
Interview respondent 8: Woman, 25 years 
 
00:00 I: Welcome, can you first mention your age and your nationality? 
 
00:11 R8: I am 25, and I am from Estonia (Estland) 
 
00:28 I: The first question is quite general, what do you know about the process of European 
integration, and then in general lines, what you know about when it started and how it 
developed?  
 
00:35 R8: In general I do know what it is, but not the specific characteristics. I do know that 
the EU played a huge role in integration, especially within Europe. There are different 
aspects probably to it. Within Europe itself but also from outside to Europe because it has 
been a very popular destination now for people from different continents. 
 
01:16 I: You mean to work in the EU (R8: Yes). Also you mentioned that it had a huge role, 
can you describe what you mean by that? 
 
01:34 R8: It has made it so much easier, because the borders are open in the sense that 
European Union members have the same rights everyone. So it makes it easier to come to a 
different country and find a job. Because companies themselves don´t have to worry about 
all the people, it provides people with much more options. And companies the possibility to 
hire people from outside their own nation state. 
 
02:14 I: Okey, do you know when the EU started? 
 
02:16 R8: Probably much earlier but I think the European Union started in the late 1990s, or 
in the beginning of 2000. At that moment was the biggest explosion of integration. 
 
02:40 I: Because you mentioned that you are from Estonia. When did Estonia join the EU? 
 
02:47 R8: In 2004 I think. 
 
02:50 I: And would you say that you know more about it from the moment that Estonia 
joined. Or do you have some knowledge from before that as well? 
 
03:01 R8: Definitely I have more knowledge afterwards, because than I was also of the age 
that I could comprehend what happened. Before that we were also occupied under Russia, 
than there was also integration but maybe in a different way. For example we had rubber 
boat travellers who run away from Estonia to Finland or Sweden. We had like war refugees, 
not exactly refugees but something like that. 
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03:38 I: So that was also a kind of cooperation with neighbours? 
 
03:46 R8: The neighbour countries did not know about it, so Estonians just went, they did 
not have the approval of the countries to go there, but they escaped from the war 
conditions. I think that was also earlier in that sense. 
 
04:10 I: For how long was Estonia under Russian occupation? 
 
04:18 R8: In 1991 we became independent. 
 
04:32 I: If you think about the EU, do you think it is different now than it was before? 
 
04:39 R8: Yes, it is easier, definitely easier. They kind of promote it, now they see it as a 
negative thing as well. In the beginning it was a positive thing and people felt much more 
comfortable going. Before that people were looking beyond Europe, US for example. But 
now people consider the EU, because it is the easiest option. 
 
05:08 I: And that is for Estonian people? 
 
05:12 R8: I think it can be applied for Estonian people indeed.  
 
05:23 I: A lot what you say is about migration, is that an important element for yourself? 
05:29 R8: I see it as an opportunity!  
 
05:48 I: Is it different now than like 20 years before? 
 
05:54 R8: Yes, it is difficult for Estonia, because the re-independence is only there for 27, 28 
years. 
 
06:00 I: It is easier to live in the EU, because it has some advantages, do you have any other 
examples except from the open borders? 
 
06:19 R8: I do not know how it has been here but for Estonia it has been good because it 
brought in new businesses. And the money as well, we used to have our own money and 
now we have the Euro. This has made it easier as well, to make business and to be part of 
Europe. 
 
06:40 I: So the Euro mentally but also physically played a big role for more integration.  
 
06:57 R8: Yes I think so. I think it was a difficult transition because Estonians were keen on 
their own money... 
 
07:02 I: Because it was not too long ago right? 
 
07:06 R8: No, it was 2011 actually. So it was very recent and there was a lot of discussion 
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about if it was a good thing or a bad think. I think it was a good thing but it also sad because 
we are very proud on our nation, nationality and independence. I think because it is so 
recent and I have only grown up with it. 
 
07:29 I: That seems clear. If you think about certain parties or organizations in European 
integration. Like organizations, people or parties would you then identify? 
 
07:45 R8: That is more difficult because I am not that familiar with all the parties.... (I: 
explains question). But I think all the instances which are in Brussels, they are on different 
places but mainly Brussels of course. I am trying of the names in English but I only know 
them in Estonian.... I think the UN also, I think they also play a role but I do not know 
specifically how. 
 
09:11 I: You mentioned the instances in Brussels, do you know any specific agencies? 
09:21 R8: The EP is there right. I think it is a language barrier right now...I can remember 
them in Estonian but not in English.. 
 
09:42 I: Maybe you can describe what they do? Which kind of people go there? 
 
09:49 R8: Yes, politicians mainly, also from Estonia (I: explains European Commission and 
European Council) 
 
10:45 I: Okey, so we identified some organizations, so we talked earlier about the 
companies and we found the agencies in Brussels and the UN. If you think about these 
organizations, do you think they promote further integration or are they against it? 
 
10:58 R8: I think they promote integration because they probably see it as a way, not 
directly, to connect countries and deal with globalization. On a smaller scale of course but I 
think they see it as a good way to have common agreements instead of a lot of separate 
systems. 
 
12:05 I: So you think that especially global forces are influential in this? (R8: Yes). Is that also 
maybe because you lived in Estonia which is close to Russia? 
 
12:22 R8: Yes, because I have seen from a close perspective that it is nice to have Europe 
behind our back. Because in recent years it has been a hot topic again and Russia has make 
some strong arguments about wanting to take back our country. 
 
12:38 I: Can you maybe talk a bit more about that, the situation in Estonia with Russia and 
the EU? 
 
12:47 R8: It is very difficult, first of all a lot of countries, they know Estonia, they recognize 
Estonia, but there is still a lot which they do not know about us. And what Europe covers 
about the relation between us and Russia it is very different than what we see. And for 
Estonians it is a scary moment as well because we are afraid of the fact that Putin or Russia 
in general can come and take over whenever they want. It has been very critical and of 
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course we have a border with Russia and that border has been changing a lot. It used to be 
much more easier but now it is harder to go to Russia and we need a Visa of course. Also we 
have a lot of Russians in Estonia, who have been there for so long but who still think of 
themselves as Russians. They want Estonia to belong to Russia. It is a very thin line where 
we are walking right now. There was this case, one Estonian, a political person, was walking 
on the border, but the border is not defined, it is not a clear border between the countries. 
He was captured by the Russians and kept in Russia for two years as a political prisoner. 
Only last year he was traded for another Russian who Estonia kept. It is still politically very 
critical and I think having the EU and NATO behind us is a little bit comforting. 
 
14:58 I: Because you mentioned there is a difference between how the EU talks and how it 
acts? 
 
15:01 R8: I think they cannot go in detail as well so I do not blame them. But Estonia goes 
much more in detail about how it actually is. But Estonia does also not talk so much about 
what is going on in here. About UK and the EU, Greece or Italy and the refugees they have. 
Because we do not actually take in so many refugees, we are very separate from that. We 
were agreeing on it but people do not really want to come to Estonia I think. 
 
15:45 I: We talk about especially the relation with Russia, with the NATO and the EU. If we 
talk about your own opinion about the EU, we can identify, for which I make a difference 
between political and social organizations. I have two pictures here. The first one is of 
Marine le Pen, she is one of the most critical European politicians, she is France and 
complains a lot about the EU. She argues that all countries should be independent again, 
that is one side of the story. The other picture is one of briefly after WWII, when the EU 
started, with the French and German Prime Ministers in France, on a memorial for the fallen 
soldiers of WWII. Which is an example of European unification. If we talk about certain 
political parties, which can be from Estonia, but also European politicians or political 
organizations in general. Do they influence your own opinion about the EU? 
 
17:10 R8: I think not so much, if we call media a instance than maybe. Politically no because 
I am politically very neutral. I like to read up and know what is going down. But I do not have 
that many opinions based on political party opinions. I create my own opinions based on the 
things I hear, but I do not change them because one political party for example changes. 
 
17:49 I: Do you read about political news? 
17:53 R8: A little bit yes, but not that much. Because I also get frustrated a bit about it. I 
think political news is not covered very neutral, there is always somebody´s opinion behind 
it. Right now you always see something about Trump, which is very exhausting, sometimes I 
see something more interesting. With Brexit, I did follow the news, because I thought it was 
important. But it was not widely covered in Estonia. 
 
18:45 I: Are there political parties in Estonia which are pro or against the EU? 
18:51 R8: I think it is pro- or anti-Russia actually. There is one political party, which has been 
pro-Russia, they are now trying to change but they have been pro-Russia historically. When 
there are elections, people who vote for them are Russians, old people who are still from 
  
62 
Russian times. This political party has a very strong pro-Russia message and not so much 
than EU of course.  
 
19:28 I: Of course you talked already about the media, if you talk about social organizations, 
they are more broader organizations, which you can mention. I again have an example of a 
very anti-EU organization, which is Pegida. Pegida was a protest organization, especially in 
2015, 2016, against migrants. Especially in Germany but also in the Netherlands. (R8: The 
Turkish migrants?) I: No not the Turkish migrants, but more the refugees, during the migrant 
crisis in 2015 and 2016. There were a lot of people on the streets with the signs, especially 
in Germany after Merkel mentioned that they could welcome all the refugees. A grass-roots 
anti-EU organization. On the other side we have AEGEE, which is a student organization 
which have charities in a lot of European countries. They try to unify all the students by 
organizing exchanges etc. If you think about social organizations, you already mention the 
media, do they have an influence on your opinion about the EU? 
 
20:54 R8: Yes, I think so, I think more than the political parties.  
 
20:56 I: Especially news media than or more civil society organizations? 
 
21:03 R8: News media is the one I have most access to of course. In a broader sense they 
are a lot of options, like television programs, but that is also a news media of course.  
 
21:22 I: Which media channels do you use most often? 
 
21:27 R8: Actually Estonian to be honest. Estonian national television website, I follow that 
one. And another organization, they have the watchdog reputation in Estonia, they cover it 
from all different aspects, they have television programs but also news sites, which cover 
things happening in the EU. They have a column focusing specifically on that, you can use 
which column you want but there is one specifically focusing on that. 
 
22:19 I: If you read this kind of news. You already mentioned that you read the facts and you 
base your opinion partly on that? 
 
22:29 R8: I have a background in media production so I kind of know how the news is 
generated. So I try to find the neutral media to bind my position on. If a read a one-sided 
article about the EU, I figure that I am sceptical because I do not see things black and white. 
I do not change my opinion every day. I use it more to understand and know what is going 
on but not too much to think too much about it. 
 
23:17 I: So your own background in your studies is quite important? 
23:25 R8: Yes, I think it helped me a lot how to critically review and examine news media. 
 
23:35 I: And apart from the news media are there other civil society organizations which 
influence your opinion? Like the church or other organizations? 
 
23:49 R8: I think that it very deeply rooted in Estonia, we are not a religious country, so we 
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do not have a huge influence from the church. It is mainly news. 
 
24:09 I: That were the questions about other actors. If we think about for example the 
economic situation in the EU. There are a lot of opinions about that as well, people say that 
they pay a lot to the EU but they do not get much back from it. In the Netherlands they for 
example mention that they pay a lot but that the money goes to the South. Doe you think 
you personally benefit from the fact that Estonia is now in the EU? 
 
24:43 R8: Yes, I think so. The reason behind it is more difficult but Estonia does get a lot of 
money from the EU. We are one of those countries which gets a lot of money from the 
bigger countries and we have been able to develop as a country because of that. Improve 
our nation because.  
 
25:19 I: The businesses were able to develop themselves as you mentioned before. Does 
that make you more positive? 
 
25:38 R8: Yes, I think so. 
 
25:39 I: Would your opinion have been more negative if Estonia would not have benefited.. 
 
25:42 R8: That is a hard question to answer because I do not know what the situation would 
be 
 
25:57 I: Do you understand arguments about that the EU only benefits the rich and not the 
poor or that countries get divided into receiving and paying countries. 
 
26:15 R8: But I think that it is always divided, there are always some who benefit more. But 
if you think about the EU, there is not a direct link to benefit, but actually all countries 
benefit. Because if the EU is doing good, in the long run all countries are doing good. And if 
one is doing bad this has to be solved because this can impact the whole EU as a union. 
 
26:46 I: Some questions about the democratic situation in the European Union. Because you 
already mentioned briefly the European Parliament. Next year we are going to have 
elections for the EP, in 2019. Are you planning to vote? 
 
27:04 R8: Yes, of course. I do take it very seriously, I do not yet know who I am voting for.  
 
27:19 I: You take it seriously, why do you think it is important? 
 
27:25 R8: Because it is my duty to be a citizen and as an Estonian. We all complain about it 
but if we do not vote we cannot change anything. I do not think that my vote can change a 
lot but at least I am doing something. 
 
27:44 I: Do you think that everybody should vote? 
 
27:48 R8: Yes, I think so. Well, everybody who is within the laws of course.  
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27:57 I: Because you think it is the duty as a citizen to be politically active. (R8: yes). You 
already mentioned that you own vote will not make much of a difference. If we think about 
the EU, do you think that it is a democratic organization? 
 
28:17 R8: I think yes but I do not have argumentation for that. I do not know what goes on 
very deep inside. If you would want to you could always find counterarguments to that but 
not everything can happen at once. The EU is not so old or so long.  
 
29:00 I: If for example the whole of Estonia would vote for a political party which takes 
education very high in its value. Do you think that the EU would think very strictly about the 
Estonian concerns? That your votes would be respected.. 
 
29:26 R8: Yes and no. Of course they will be respected but I do not think that it is very 
feasible to think that if only Estonia says that education is important that it should be a key 
issue. That is the democratic part about it, there are so many nations and countries in EU. So 
it has to be benefiting them all and it would be nice if the issues are addressed or at least 
mentioned. Of course an issue has different components and not everything can be done at 
once. But it would be nice if the issue would be taken into concern and they acknowledge 
that. But it would be foolish to think that now we can change everything after the elections.  
 
30:15 I: That was just to give an example, sometimes I make some statements to 
understand what comes behind your opinion.... Now we are at the last few questions, we 
already talked about your background, about the country in which you grew up in. You 
mentioned, because of the situation in Estonia, you have a specific opinion about the EU, 
you talked about safety and guardianship of the EU against Russia. Do you think that your 
opinion would have been different if you had grown up in another country. Is your opinion 
specific for an Estonian? 
 
31:12 R8: I think it is, I think it is strongly affected by the fact that I am Estonian and grew up 
in that culture. So it is hard to say that it would have been different if I had grown up in a 
Western European country. 
 
31:34 I: And are there any other things, we already talked about the church, other 
characteristics of yourself which influence your opinion, like your education or the way you 
grew up? 
 
31:59 R8: I think education would be one and also the opportunities I had during growing 
up. Because I spend a year in America during growing up, earlier. This actually sparked an 
interest in politics, because I was there during the first Obama election circle. It was very 
interesting to see how different things were there than they are here. I think the 
opportunities I had shaped by opinion. But also my family... 
 
32:38 I: What role does your family play? 
 
32:46 R8: They have raised me, in an Estonian culture, these things are intertwined. They 
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have thought me from the perspective they grew up with and they grew up in deep Russia, 
in Russian times and everything. They have given me the pride that I have for Estonia. That 
is also why I analyse from the perspective of Estonia and cannot put myself anywhere else. 
 
33:27 I: One last thing we can talk about is our age. Especially for your generation in Estonia, 
there could be a difference between your generation and older generation, you already 
mentioned it briefly. Do you think the opinion would be different for other generations? 
 
33:52 R8: Well I think the main difference was, when we talk about the EU for example, the 
older generation was against it more, more against Europe. Younger people have the 
opportunity and the chances we had and we have had the chance to study and travel 
abroad. I think that older people are more against the EU than younger people. 
 
34:21 I: What is the reason that they are more against it? 
 
34:26 R8: I think they see it as a way of giving up a little bit of their independence. Of course 
it is important for us as well to keep the independence and everything. But we see the EU as 
a possibility and not as a restriction of our independence. It it just the way that things 
change or sometimes have to change. I think that older people do not have a more difficult 
time but a different vision of it.  
 
35:10 I: We are at the last question. We talk about political and social organizations, the 
economic situation and the democratic legitimacy of the EU and about your own 
background. If you take all these different elements into account. Which one or which ones 
do you think have the most influence? 
 
35:37 R8: Can you specify what you mean? 
 
35:59 I: Well if I would summarize your own opinion, it is influenced by your own 
background and alongside that you read a lot, you read the columns and you make sure that 
you read neutral media items, because you have the experience with your studies. And 
based on this neutral news, you sometimes differentiate your opinion.... 
 
36:25 R8: I think that is my background which is most important, like growing up in Estonia 
and being Estonian. I think that that really has influenced me the most. 
 
36:45 I: The things you read are like sideline information? 
 
36:51 R8: Yes, I am still an independent person, I am of course Estonian, I think what I read 
helps my understand things better. Shape my opinion. 
 
37:07 I: So that's it for me at least, do you have any things to add or any questions? 
 
37:19 R8: No, I think no, I think it is pretty clear. 
 
37:24 I: Okey, than I will stop the recording. 
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Appendix 5: Dutch interview quotes 
 
[Quote 1, Elske, 22] ¨R4: Ik denk dat ik wel eerst zou denken aan Nederlandse politieke 
partijen. Gewoon omdat je van een aantal partijen wel weet hoe zij daar tegenover staan, 
tegenover uitbreiding van de Europese Unie. Ik denk eigenlijk dat ik weinig weet van 
bepaalde figuren op Europees niveau. Dat je misschien een Frans Timmermans en die 
Donald Tusk, dat soort figuren zou ik dan als eerste aan denken en niet echt historische 
figuren ofzo.¨ 
 
[Quote 4, Elske, 22] ¨R4: Nouja voor bedrijven is dat natuurlijk enorm aantrekkelijk, vooral 
op economisch vlak, dat het makkelijker is om van het ene land naar het andere land te 
gaan en ook voor bijvoorbeeld importheffingen. Dat is ongetwijfeld voor bedrijven een stuk 
makkelijker.¨ 
 
[Quote 5, Freek, 24] ¨R2: Ik denk dat de commissie en het EP in meerdere mate positief hier 
tegenover staan. De media niet sowieso. En de raad, de nationale parlementen en de 
burgers zijn heel divers denk ik maar die neigen iets meer naar negatief.¨ 
 
[Quote 9, Sophie, 25] ¨R7: Ja, ik ben gewoon niet zo politiek gericht, ik vind politiek meer 
een spelletje en ik vind sociale organisaties, dat vind ik persoonlijker. Dat doen mensen echt 
voor zichzelf. Dan wil ik niet zeggen dat politieke personen daar niet voor zichzelf staan, en 
niet in hun recht staan. Maar het is gewoon een politiek spelletje, ik ben daar iets minder 
geïnteresseerd in.¨ 
 
[Quote 11, Sander, 23] ¨Pegida zit niet in heel Europa, vooral Duitsland en Nederland 
volgens mij. Ik denk ook die politieke partijen die tegen de EU aan schoppen, en dan 
helemaal de extreem-rechts, semi-nationalistische partijen dat die dusdanig extreem zijn 
dat mensen ook inzien van, misschien moet er iets verbeteren aan de EU, maar zo extreem 
wil je eigenlijk nooit meer want dan merk je waar toe dat zou kunnen laten. Dus ook in die 
mate krijg ik een meer positief idee van de Europese Unie. Van als wij samen zijn, kunnen 
wij ook tegen dat soort gekkies, kan je daar ook sterker in zijn.¨ 
 
[Quote 13, Mathijs, 22] ¨Ik haal mijn meningen uit verschillende bronnen en wat jij dagelijks 
hoort, in het nieuws, dan weer iets anders, daarop baseer ik mijn mening. Ik neig niet naar 
een partij of een persoon¨ 
 
[Quote 20, Pien, 18] ¨Ik denk hoe meer kennis ik vergaar via mijn studie dat dat alleen mijn 
mening zou vervormen dan perse iets wat ik zie op televisie van bepaalde groepen. 
Aangezien dat academisch is en ik daar beter mijn mening op kan vormen voor mijzelf dan 
op wat andere mensen roepen.¨ 
 
[Quote 21, Mathijs, 22] ¨R13: Bij mij merk ik dat mijn ouders wel veel invloed hebben gehad. 
Op een latere leeftijd dat ik dan ook de mening van kennissen en vrienden mee neem. Dat je 
dan ook echt zelf een mening gaat vormen.¨ 
 
[Quote 22, Sander, 23] ¨In principe van VWO ga je door, nou dan ga je studeren, en in 
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principe ga je dan in grote mate met alleen maar studenten om. Dan ga je naar Amsterdam, 
de meesten wonen daar, ga je ook bij een studentenvereniging. En omdat dat dan allemaal 
kan, je wordt niet tegengewerkt, tegen hele zware drempels aanloopt, alles kan dat dat heel 
erg bijdraagt aan een positief beeld.¨ 
 
[Quote 24, Marloes, 22] ¨R3: Misschien niet direct, maar ik denk dat vooral media wel 
invloed kunnen hebben, als zij bijvoorbeeld positieve of negatieve dingen tonen. Maar ik 
denk wel misschien indirect.¨ 
 
[Quote 25, Freek, 23] ¨Nou, Pegida wel, dat is een organisatie waarmee ik mij niet 
identificeer, waar ik mij zelfs sterk van af zet maar ja dat wordt wederom vanuit een 
bepaald frame, dat zie ik ook weer vanuit een bepaald frame van mijzelf. Dus die acties 
analyseer ik ook vanuit dat idee. Dus ik ben al, ik voel mijzelf al op een bepaalde manier pro-
Europees dus als ik dan zoiets als Pegida of de PVV ofzo zie, dan is dat al bij voorbaat dat ik 
daar al een bepaald beeld van heb.¨ 
 
 
